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CLASSIFICATION <u>SECRET</u>		
COUNTRY <u>East Germany</u>	REPORT <u>639762</u>	
TOPIC <u>KVP Supply System</u>		
EVALUATION <u></u>	PLACE OBTAINED <u></u>	
DATE OF CONTENT <u></u>		
DATE OBTAINED <u></u>		DATE PREPARED <u>6 August 1954</u>
REFERENCES <u></u>		
PAGES <u>3</u> ENCLOSURES (NO. & TYPE) <u></u>		
REMARKS <u>This is UNEVALUATED</u>		
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1. In May 1954, the Artillery Supply Section of the KVP Department in the Ministry of the Interior in Strausberg had the following personnel:
Major General Walz, section chief;
Lieutenant Colonel Bartsch, first deputy;
Major Boerner, second deputy;
Major Fritzsche, production chief for artillery weapons;
Lieutenant Gall, production chief for infantry weapons;
Lieutenant Schmidt, production chief for optical instruments.
The installations in Doberlug were subordinate to the Artillery Supply Section.
2. An office for inventions and improvements was established in the Artillery Supply Section. The bureau was headed by Dr Wolf, a civilian, who was detached to the military academy in Dresden as a lecturer for ballistics. During Wolf's absence, Major Bayer (fnu) was head of the invention office.
3. Captain Meltzer, deputy supply chief in Doberlug, was reassigned to Dresden III (unit designation). He was succeeded by Lieutenant Lindenhahn. 2
4. The most frequent repair work done at the KVP central workshop in Doberlug involved:
 - a. repair of guns which had been overturned by careless driving;
 - b. repair of recoil brakes which, after the brake fluid had turned to acid, were heavily rusted. The brake fluid called "S-sol" was delivered by the USSR;
 - c. Repair of levels in aiming circles.
5. Guns and equipment beyond repair were taken apart at the central KVP workshop. Scrapping work was done by "VEB Schrott" in Riesa.
6. Although all small spare parts could be produced at the central workshop, the capacity of the installation did meet requirements. Work that could not be done at Doberlug was taken over by the industrial plant in Mittenwalde near Koenigswusterhausen. Meier, the chief of the plant had been wearing a uniform for several weeks. The plant at Mittenwalde is

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no longer a civilian enterprise. It is said to have a high production capacity.

7. The following is a production plan for the central workshop as of late June 1954:

Legend:

A -- serial number
 B -- kind of weapon
 C -- number of workers assigned to brigade
 D -- working hours of brigade per month
 E -- standard time for repair work, expressed in working hours
 F -- scheduled labor capacity (in working hours)
 G -- actual labor capacity (in working hours)
 H -- type of repair work

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	carbines	5	970	4.2	231	266	complete overhaul
2	submachine guns	6	1,164	5	233.8	270	"
3	machine guns	7	1,358	10	135.8	161	" overhauled by 20 percent
4	medium mortars without bipod	1	194	2.8	69.3	80	complete overhaul
5	medium mortars with bipod	1	194	20.5	9.5	11	"
6	heavy mortars	2	388	45	8	9.2	"
7	37-mm AA guns	9	1,746	200	6.7	7.7	medium repair
8	57-mm AA guns	9	1,746	133	13.1	15.5	"
9	76-mm guns	9	1,746	133	13.1	15.5	"
10	122-mm guns	9	1,746	198	8.8	10	" 3

The production plan was based on an average of 206 man-hours per month, with 6 percent deducted for furlough, sickness and technical difficulties.

8. In mid-June 1954, it was learned that armorers-artificers were not to have a rank higher than corporal. The term of service for armorers-artificers already promoted will not be prolonged. It was expected that sufficient replacements for these positions could be recruited from locksmiths, plumbers and similar professions after introduction of universal military service. The armorers-artificer serving with the troop units had to cope with many difficulties resulting from frequent change of ordnance personnel, structural changes

9. From 14 to 19 June, a first instruction course for artillery supply officers of division and regimental headquarters of the army and of air force headquarters was conducted in Doberlug. Seventeen officers from lieutenant to captain participated. More courses were to follow. The reason for these courses was the failure of the army artillery supply system during the maneuvers near Eggesin. It was determined during these exercises that a high percentage of the weapons and equipment was unserviceable. Workshops of the divisions and regiments were unable to make minor repairs. It was planned to establish a central department for technology with the artillery supply section in the Ministry of the Interior. The section will have to cope with the following tasks:

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- a. administration of workshops
- b. the preparation of a manual on war equipment
- c. the preparation of a manual on repair work
- d. delineation of missions assigned to division, regimental and battalion workshops and the central workshop at Doberlug.

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10. In mid-June, numerous boxes were piled up in the ordnance depot of the KVP along the Doberlug-Kirchhain-Finsterwalde railroad line at the railroad stop of Memmersdorf. Materiel seen in open sheds included about 15 M-43 infantry guns of caliber 76 mm, 15 to 20 guns on two-axle carriages with double tires and 60 x 45-mm light AT guns. The guard and labor personnel were quartered in four two-story depot buildings each about 50 meters long.

1. Comment. The names of almost all officers are known.
2. Comment. Dresden III is an artillery school.
3. Comment. It is noteworthy that the list does not mention the 152-mm howitzer.
4. Comment. Information probably refers to the spring inspections held from late April to mid-May.
5. Comment. This is the first information that the KVP is equipped with 76-mm M-1943 infantry guns. The guns were probably confused with 76-mm M-1942 Zis-3 field guns.

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